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Pharma on the Hot Seat
Nicole Huberfeld∗
ABSTRACT: The pharmaceutical industry has been receiving greater scrutiny lately due
in large part to the many public and private legal enforcement actions taken against
pharmaceutical manufacturers. These enforcement actions, along with legal
developments such as the OIG Compliance Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers,
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s statutory guidelines for public corporations, the HIPAA
privacy regulations, and the Medicare Modernization Act, have the potential to encourage
the pharmaceutical industry to self-regulate beyond the bounds currently required by the
law. After a brief overview of enforcement actions and compliance programs directed
toward the pharmaceutical industry, this Article reviews a similar situation the hospital
industry faced when Medicare promulgated major reimbursement modifications. The
Article proposes that the pharmaceutical industry, in the face of such intense scrutiny and
uncertainty, should implement more rigorous self-regulation. Without more stringent
self-regulation, this intense interest in the pharmaceutical industry may result in a
regulatory push that establishes unanticipated and cumbersome measures for the industry.
Though headlines like “Gimme an Rx! Cheerleaders Pep Up Drug Sales” do not
necessarily reflect accurately the pharmaceutical industry, its culture, or its practices, they
do demonstrate that the industry (and its associates, medical devices and biologics) has
drawn high profile scrutiny.1 This intense interest issues from multiple sources; by
example, criminal and civil investigations and settlements pursued by the Department of
Justice (DOJ) and the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) have become
headline-grabbers.2
Other legal developments also have focused greater attention on the pharmaceutical
industry. Among the most notable are the Office of the Inspector General for the
Department of Health and Human Services’ (OIG) Compliance Guidance for
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and its subsequent attention to the industry;3 the SarbanesOxley Act’s statutory guidance for public corporations and the increased importance of
corporate best practices; the privacy regulations of the Health Insurance Portability and
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1
See Stephanie Saul, Gimme an Rx! Cheerleaders Pep Up Drug Sales, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2005, at A1;
see also Reed Abelson, Whistle-Blower Suit Says Device Maker Generously Rewards Doctors, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 24, 2006, at C1 (discussing the whistleblower action against Medtronic and noting the general
interest in the financial transactions occurring in the medical device industry).
2
See Reimbursement and Access to Prescription Drugs Under Medicare Part B, 107th Cong. 88–89 (2002)
(statement of Janet Rehnquist, Inspector Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs. (DHHS)), available
at finance.senate.gov/hear-ings/81823.pdf (last visited May. 24, 2007); Press Release, Off. of Inspector
Gen. (OIG), DHHS, OIG Report Highlights Progress Against Waste, Abuse, and Fraud (Dec. 9, 2004),
available at oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/press/2004/120904Release.pdf (last visited May. 24, 2007).
3
See, e.g., OIG, DHHS, FISCAL YEAR 2005 WORK PLAN - PUBLIC HEALTH AGENCIES 5 (2005),
available at oig.hhs.gov/reading/workplan/2005/2005WPPHAs.pdf (last visited May. 24, 2007).
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Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA); and the Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement
and Modernization Act of 2003 (MMA) with the Medicare Part D drug benefit.4
The impact of these disparate developments, combined, indicates a need for proactive
vigilance through compliance programs that surpass the “letter” of current law, a lesson
that may be learned from the experiences of others in the health-care industry. After
considering the above-mentioned legal developments, this Article will briefly review the
attention that the hospital industry sustained both before and after major reimbursement
modifications were imposed by Medicare. The hospital experience suggests that players
in the healthcare industry, when subject to uncertainty combined with intense scrutiny,
may need to self-regulate to a degree that exceeds apparent legal requirements.

I. High Profile Settlements
A recent OIG Semi-Annual Report illustrates the attention being paid to the
pharmaceutical industry.5 In that document, the OIG identified multimillion-dollar
recoveries resulting from investigating and settling with the pharmaceutical industry (i.e.,
recoveries not involving judicial conclusions or awards) and described the new
responsibilities that result from the Medicare drug benefit.6 Among the pharmaceutical
industry settlements listed are a $345.5 million settlement with Schering-Plough, a $5.9
million settlement with PharMerica, and a settlement with a stand-alone pharmacy for
$476,000.7 After this Semi-Annual Report was published, King Pharmaceuticals agreed
to pay $124 million and to enter into a five-year corporate integrity agreement (CIA) to
settle allegations of fraud related to rebates required by federal Medicaid rules.8
4

The spotlight also is intensified by Senator Chuck Grassley (R-IA), former Chair-man of the Senate
Finance Committee (and self-created Healthcare Fraud Czar), who acts as a “whistleblower” on the
“management practices of the IRS, FBI, Department of Homeland Security and the Centers for Medicare
and Medic-aid Services” and who lately has commented with vigor on the FDA and the pharmaceutical
industry. See U.S. Senator Chuck Grassley, Biography, at tinyurl.com/l6k5a (last visited May 24, 2007);
Press Release, Gov’t Accountability Project, Senator Grassley Investigates Charges of FDA and Wyeth
Misconduct (Nov. 18, 2005), available at www.whistleblower.org/content/press_detail.cfm?press_id=291
(last visited May 24, 2007); Kaiser Family Foundation, Senators Introduce Bill to Establish New FDA
Prescription Drug Safety Office, DAILY HEALTH POL’Y REP., Apr. 28, 2005, available at
tinyurl.com/gcgf3 (last visited May 24, 2007).
5
See OIG, DHHS, SEMIANNUAL REP. at 13, 15 (Oct. – Mar. 2005), available at
oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/semiannual/2005/SemiannualSpring05.pdf. The most recent Semiannual
Report continues the trend of scrutiny, reporting investigations of Average Manufacturer Price, 340B drug
pricing, and Medicare Part B drug pricing in addition to the highly publicized settlement with the
prescription benefit manager AdvancePCS (for $137.5 million). See OIG, DHHS, SEMIANNUAL REP. at
3-5, 22 (April - Sep. 2006), available at oig.hhs.gov/publications/docs/semiannual/2006/Semiannual%20Final%20FY%202006.pdf.
6
See OIG, DHHS, SEMIANNUAL REP. (Oct. - March 2005) at 11 – 14.
7
Id. at 13, 15.
8
Press Release, U.S. Attorney E. Dist. of Pa., U.S. Dep’t of Justice (DOJ), U.S. Reaches $124 Million
Settlement with Drug Maker (Nov. 1, 2005), available at
www.usdoj.gov/usao/pae/News/Pr/2005/nov/Kingpressrelease.pdf (last visited May. 24, 2007); see
Corporate Integrity Agreement Between the Office of Inspector General of the Department of Health and
Human Services and King Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Oct. 31, 2005, at 1, available at
oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cia/agreements/KingPharmaceuticalsCIA.pdf (last visited May 24, 2007).
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Such multimillion-dollar payments are a continuation of a re-cent string of highly
publicized settlements with the pharmaceutical industry.9 The prominence of these
federal investigations was launched with the TAP Pharmaceutical Products, Inc. (TAP)
global settlement of 2001, which cost the manufacturer of the prostate cancer drug
Lupron $875 million in criminal and civil penalties.10 TAP was the federal government’s
first “big win” against a major player in the pharmaceutical industry (and, as is common
practice with government settlements, created a source of funding for ongoing efforts to
investigate and prosecute pharmaceutical companies).11 The prosecution’s theory in the
TAP case was that the company had guided physicians to receive reimbursement for
samples of drugs; had “marketed the spread” between the cost to physicians of
purchasing Lupron and the reimbursement available from the federal government due to
the average wholesale price (AWP) of Lupron, arguably facilitating over-reimbursement
by its buyers; and had given kickbacks to physicians for prescribing certain TAP
products.12 The sales practices described in the complaint were not unique to TAP, but a
TAP sales representative had attempted to pay a kickback to a doctor, who then reported
the bribe to the federal government, thus bringing TAP’s business practices to the
attention of federal prosecutors.13 TAP put the pharmaceutical industry on the fraud
prosecution map.14 The settlement effectively posted a notice to the largest corporations
in the healthcare industry that the DOJ, the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services
(CMS), and the OIG were turning their attention to the pharmaceutical industry, which
largely had been left alone during the years of increasing healthcare fraud prosecutions.15
9

Stephanie Greene, False Claims Act Liability for Off-Label Promotion of Pharmaceutical Products, 110
PENN ST. L. REV. 41, 42 & n.9 (2005) (noting recent government actions and outcomes against the
pharmaceutical industry).
10
See OIG, DHHS, SEMIANNUAL REP. at 18 (Oct. – Mar. 2002), available at
oig.hhs.gov/reading/semiannual/2002/Spring%20SemiAnnual%202002.pdf (last visited May 24, 2007).
11
See GlaxoSmithKline Settles Fraud Allegations Under False Claims Act, INSIDE CMS, Oct. 6, 2005, at
20. Cf. Pamela H. Bucy, The Path from Regulator to Hunter: The Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion in
the Investigation of Physicians at Teaching Hospitals, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 3, 15 (2000) (explaining the
self-funding mechanism for prosecutions under HIPAA in the context of teaching hospital prosecutions,
called PATH audits); Robert Salcido, The Government’s Increasing Use of the False Claims Act Against
the Health Care Industry, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 457, 463 & n.35 (2003) (describing how certain provisions
of HIPAA facilitated use of False Claims Act recoveries for additional prosecutions).
12
Press Release, DOJ, TAP Pharmaceutical Products Inc. and Seven Others Charged with Health Care
Crimes; Company Agrees to Pay $875 Million to Settle Charges (Oct. 3, 2001) [hereinafter Press Release,
TAP], available at www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2001/October/513civ.htm (last visited May 24, 2007); see OIG,
DHHS, Civil Monetary Penalties: Kickback and Physician Self-Referral (Jan. 13, 2003), available at
oig.hhs.gov/fraud/enforcement/administrative/cmp/cmpitems.html#3 (last visited May 24, 2007) (noting
that physicians who received kickbacks from TAP were also charged under the Anti-kickback Statute).
13
Press Release, TAP, supra note 12.
14
See Pamela H. Bucy, Games and Stories: Game Theory and the Civil False Claims Act, 31 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 603, 611 & n.43 (2004) (citing TAP as one example of the grandiosity of False Claims Act
settlements); Joan H. Krause, Regulating, Guiding, and Enforcing Health Care Fraud, 60 N.Y.U. ANN.
SURV. AM. L. 241, 267 – 68 (2004) (noting that the TAP settlement highlighted the potential for abusing
average wholesale price); Sheryl Calabro, Note, Breaking the Shield of the Learned Intermediary Doctrine:
Placing the Blame Where it Belongs, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 2241, 2265 (2004) (noting that TAP was the
largest healthcare fraud settlement in history when it was announced by the Department of Justice).
15
See Abelson, supra note 1 (reporting that eight of the major medical device manufacturers were
subpoenaed in 2005 by U. S. Attorneys).
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From an industry perspective, one major disadvantage of settlements (as opposed to
judgments) is that the precedential and informational function that case law serves in a
common law system is largely absent. Because the courts often are involved minimally in
settlement agreements in the healthcare arena, or involved only in long-running discovery
disputes, each new investigation presents legal uncertainty for the company subject to
inquiry because the bounds of the law remain unknown. In a system that relies on the
common law for cues regarding acceptable behavior, the lack of traditional precedent
(leading to reliance on authoritative but nonbinding information) is unsettling and
potentially inefficient.16
Though CIAs (discussed further below) slightly alleviate this void of case law by
providing insight into evolving enforcement expectations, they are binding only on the
entity settling with the DOJ and the OIG.17 Investigators have wide discretion in
determining the consequences of an investigation. And, at the time these high profile
settlements were in their investigatory stages (e.g., the TAP investigation began with a
whistleblower complaint in 1996),18 the pharmaceutical industry had not been issued
compliance program guidance by the OIG. However, it is important to acknowledge the
development of the Compliance Program Guidance (CPG) for the pharmaceutical
industry19 and the comparable private guidances that seek to provide additional
compliance benchmarks.

II. Compliance Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers
In May 2003, the OIG issued the long-awaited CPG for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers.20
Before the CPG was issued for the pharmaceutical industry, the OIG already had released
16

See Krause, supra note 14, at 263 – 65 (noting that enforcement as a substitute for regulation results in
fraud allegations settling without the benefit of judicial scrutiny or formal rulemaking).
17
Cf. OIG, DHHS, Corporate Integrity Agreements—General Information [herein-after OIG, Corporate
Integrity Agreements], available at oig.hhs.gov/fraud/cias.html (last visited May 24, 2007).
18
Press Release, TAP, supra note 12.
19
OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fed. Reg. 23,731 (May 5,
2003) (notice), available at oig.hhs.gov/authorities/docs/03/050503FRCPGPharmac.pdf.
20
Id. By publishing CPGs, the OIG intends to provide clear direction on methods for avoiding healthcare
fraud to the various sectors of the healthcare industry. All of the CPGs are modeled largely on the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, specifically Chapter 8 and the considerations for sentencing of organizations; the
seven core elements of compliance programs that are emphasized in the CPGs, including the CPG for
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, are drawn from this document. Compare id. (detailing the seven core
elements of an effective compliance and ethics program, which are (1) implementing written policies and
procedures; (2) designating a compliance officer and compliance commit-tee; (3) conducting effective
training and education; (4) developing effective lines of communication; (5) conducting internal monitoring
and auditing; (6) enforcing standards through well-publicized disciplinary guidelines; and (7) responding
promptly to detected problems and undertaking corrective action), with U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (2004), available at www.ussc.gov/2004guid/CHAP8.pdf (listing the
same factors). Earlier versions of the Sentencing Guidelines list the same factors. E.g. U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1 (2003), available at www.ussc.gov/2003guid/8a1_2.htm. Despite the
Supreme Court’s ruling that the Sentencing Guidelines were unconstitutional as a binding document on
judges, they still serve as a source of direction for the OIG. Cf. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259
(2005).
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CPGs for many others in the healthcare industry, including clinical laboratories;
hospitals; home health agencies; third-party medical billing companies; durable medical
equipment, prosthetics, orthotics, and supply companies; hospices; Medicare + Choice
organizations; nursing facilities; ambulance suppliers; and individual and small group
physician practices.21 Though the practices of pharmaceutical sales representatives
arguably had been violating the federal Anti-Kickback Statute for years,22 guidance for
the pharmaceutical industry was slow in its arrival, seemingly leading pharmaceutical
manufacturers to believe that aggressive sales practices were somehow exempt from
federal fraud and abuse laws.23
The CPG for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers cataloged a variety of important risk areas to
consider as targets for compliance crackdown.24 The now-familiar areas of “significant
concern” included: “(1) Integrity of data used by state and federal governments to
establish payment amounts; (2) kickbacks and other illegal remuneration; and (3)
compliance with laws regulating drug samples.”25 Although this list seems short, it
encompasses all aspects of sales and marketing by pharmaceutical representatives that
had been utilized until the date of the CPG. For instance, doctors had come to anticipate
perks from their drug representatives, ranging from weekly pizza lunches for office staff
to free tickets to Broadway performances to all expense-paid educational conferences in
exotic locales.26 The OIG made it clear that such extras would be interpreted as improper
21

See OIG, DHHS, Fraud Prevention and Detection, Compliance Guidance, at
oig.hhs.gov/fraud/complianceguidance.html (last visited May 24, 2007).
22
See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b) (2006); Jonathan K. Henderson & Quintin Cassady, Drug Deals in 2006:
Cutting Edge Legal and Regulatory Issues in the Pharmaceutical Industry, 15 ANNALS HEALTH L. 107,
128 – 30 (2006) (describing the Anti-Kickback Statute violations that have been on the OIG’s radar since
the early 1990s).
23
Nevertheless, the guidance has been relatively swift in its impact. See Marc J. Scheineson & Shannon
Thyme Klinger, Lessons from Expanded Government En-forcement Efforts Against Drug Companies, 60
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1, 12 – 13 (2005) (asserting the importance of effective compliance and ethics
programs in pharmaceutical companies given the focus on the industry); Harvey Yampolsky, 10 Years
Later, A Healthy Dose of Fraud Enforcement for Pharmaceutical Companies, BUS. CRIMES BULL., Nov.
2002, at 3 (noting the shift in prosecutorial focus to the pharmaceutical industry).
24
OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fed. Reg. at 23,734 – 39.
25
Id. at 23, 733.
26
Concerned about physicians’ expectation that drug representatives would provide them with such “bread
and butter” perks, the American Medical Association added a section to its Code of Medical Ethics entitled
“Gifts to Physicians from Industry” that predated the OIG’s guidance by several years. See CODE OF
MEDICAL ETHICS § E-8.061 (Council on Ethical & Judicial Affairs, Am. Med. Ass’n 2004) [hereinafter
CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS], available at tinyurl.com/27spdn (last visited May 24, 2007). This section
can be striking in the direct reaction to the relationship between physicians and the pharmaceutical
industry, noting both the pros and the cons; for instance:
Many gifts given to physicians by companies in the pharmaceutical, device, and medical
equipment industries serve an important and socially beneficial function. For example . . . funds
for educational seminars and conferences. However, there has been growing concern about certain
gifts from industry to physicians. Some gifts that reflect customary practices of industry may not
be consistent with the Principles of Medical Ethics. To avoid the acceptance of inappropriate gifts,
physicians should observe the following guidelines: (1) Any gifts accepted by physicians
individually should primarily entail a benefit to patients. . . . (2) Individual gifts of minimal value
are permissible as long as the gifts are related to the physician’s work (eg, pens and notepads). . . .
(5) Subsidies from industry should not be accepted directly or indirectly to pay for the costs of
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remuneration that is paid to physicians to influence their prescribing practices, the very
essence of improper remuneration under the Anti-Kickback Statute.27
While no healthcare provider is required legally to follow a CPG, failure to do so could
be a failure of best practices in the healthcare and the corporate context (discussed further
below). Additionally, as a practical matter, failure to comply with a CPG is likely to
result in whistleblower activity, which may subject the provider to the large settlements
and CIAs mentioned above. Settlements with the DOJ are undesirable not only because
of their unpredictability, publicity, and expense, but also because they result in CIAs.28
CIAs are akin to the most exacting compliance program, with the added pressure of the
program being subject to the vigilant supervision of the OIG (which now includes
unannounced site visits).29
Echoing the risk factors described in the CPG, a group of influential physicians published
a policy proposal in the Journal of the American Medical Association (the Policy
Proposal) asserting that all gifts to physicians, no matter how small, are improper and
should cease because they create a conflict of interest between financial gain and patient

travel, lodging, or other personal expenses of physicians attending conferences or meetings, nor
should subsidies be accepted to compensate for the physicians’ time. Subsidies for hospitality
should not be accepted outside of modest meals or social events held as a part of a conference or
meeting. . . . (7) No gifts should be accepted if there are strings attached. For example, physicians
should not accept gifts if they are given in relation to the physician’s prescribing practices.
Id. (emphasis added). The Code of Medical Ethics is nonbinding because it is not a source of legal
authority. Nevertheless, physicians who take compliance seriously tend to follow this guidance to the
extent possible. This, in turn, can affect physicians’ relationships with the sales force. See Troyen A.
Brennan et al., Health Industry Practices that Create Conflicts of Interest: A Policy Proposal for Academic
Medical Centers, 295 JAMA 429, 430–31 (2006), available at jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/reprint/295/4/429
(last visited May 24, 2007) (advocating that pharmaceutical companies cease all gifts to physicians because
they create a conflict of interest that is unavoidable even if the gift is de minimus).
27
See OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fed. Reg. at 23,737; 42
U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b).
28
See OIG, Corporate Integrity Agreements, supra note 17. Regarding the joint nature of the CIA, the OIG
stated, “The [OIG] often negotiates compliance obligations with health care providers and other entities as
part of the settlement of Federal health care program investigations arising under a variety of civil false
claims statutes.” Id.
29
See id. The OIG described corporate integrity agreements thus:
A provider or entity consents to [CIAs] as part of the civil settlement and in exchange for
the OIG’s agreement not to seek an exclusion of that health care provider or entity from
participation in Medicare, Medicaid and other Federal health care programs. . . .
Providers who settle these cases often deny that they were liable or that they committed
the alleged conduct.
Id. In the past, the OIG scheduled visits with healthcare providers who were subject to CIAs. Recently,
however, the OIG announced that it will also conduct unannounced site visits to ensure compliance with
CIAs is occurring on a day-to-day basis. See OIG Shifting to Unannounced Site Visits to Assess CIA
Compliance, Adherence, 12 HEALTH CARE DAILY (BNA) (April 26, 2007) (announced by an OIG
official at a conference of the Health Care Compliance Association on April 23, 2007).
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care.30 The authors noted that pharmaceutical companies have begun to self-regulate,
calling the effort “commendable” yet failing to “resolve the crisis.”31 The Policy Proposal
focused on marketing by pharmaceutical and medical device manufacturers aimed at
medical school residents out of a concern that such marketing in academic medical
centers may lead to career-long “bad habits” for physicians and, potentially, to ongoing
conflicts of interest in the physician/patient relation-ship.32 Academic medical centers
were also a focal point because they can act quickly and because immediate positive
impact can be felt in such settings.33 The Policy Proposal attacked the “myth” of the de
minimus gift and specifically called for stricter regulation by the federal government and
the professional associations that issue ethical guidance to physicians and to the
pharmaceutical industry.34 The authors argued that the current OIG guidance is too
forgiving and fails to protect patients, and thus they suggested that academic medical
centers should implement policies that go far beyond the bounds of the CPG.35 The
Policy Proposal strongly suggested that pharmaceutical manufacturers and medical
device companies that do not respond with more stringent compliance programs may
expect much more stringent ethical codes (if not formal federal regulations) in the near
future, given that dissatisfaction and caution now radiate from the relationship that had
provided the industry with so much consideration historically.36
Strangely, the Policy Proposal did not directly mention the Pharmaceutical Research and
Manufacturers of America (PhRMA) Code on Interactions with Healthcare Professionals
(the PhRMA Code), which was disseminated before the CPG for Pharmaceutical
Manufacturers was published.37 The PhRMA Code may not have been mentioned by the
Policy Paper because it has many elements that overlap with and are consistent with the
CPG for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, though a few aspects of the PhRMA Code are
even stricter than the OIG recommends and might have enhanced the analysis in the
Policy Proposal.38 For instance, the PhRMA Code specifically delineates appropriate
30

Brennan et al., supra note 26, at 430–31 (arguing that public and private authorities are wrong to assume
that small gifts are not harmful to the physician’s neutral decision-making ability).
31
Id. at 429 – 30.
32
See id. at 430.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 430 – 31.
35
Brennan et al, supra note 26, at 430 – 32.
36
Similarly, Senator Grassley has added to the intense scrutiny by making comments on the “cozy”
relationship between FDA leadership and the pharmaceutical industry and the conflicts of interest that may
exist. Press Release, U.S. Senator Chuck Grassley, Grassley Comment on the Opportunity for New FDA
Leadership (Sept. 23, 2005), available at tinyurl.com/yw2qqb (last visited May 24, 2007).
37
See Brennan et al., supra note 26, at 430; see generally PHARM. RESEARCH & MFRS. OF AM.
(PHRMA), CODE ON INTERACTIONS WITH HEALTHCARE PROFESSIONALS (2004) [hereinafter
PhRMA CODE], available at www.phrma.org/fi les/PhRMA%20Code.pdf (last visited May 24, 2007).
38
Senator Grassley has commented on the insufficiency of the PhRMA Code, calling for FDA regulation to
supplant its direct-to-consumer advertising suggestions. See, e.g., Memorandum from Jill Kozeny for U.S.
Senator Chuck Grassley, United States Commission on Finance 1 (Aug. 2, 2005), available at
www.senate.gov/~finance/press/Gpress/2005/prg080205a.pdf (last visited May 24, 2006). Senator Grassley
commented that the PhRMA guidelines on direct-to-consumer (DTC) advertising were inadequate and
promoting proposed legislation that would require the FDA to require review of all DTC prior to
placement.

Journal of Health Law Vol. 40 No. 2
affiliation with and payment for educational conferences, but the OIG simply states that
continuing medical education and other conferences should not be used to influence
physicians’ decision-making.39 (On the other hand, the OIG addresses drug samples and
their distribution to physicians at length, and the PhRMA Code does not discuss them.)40
Other codes of conduct also went unmentioned in the Policy Proposal, such as the AMA
Code of Medical Ethics section regarding “Gifts to Physicians from Industry”; the
AdvaMed Code of Ethics for Device Manufacturers; and the Health Industry Group
Purchasing Association Code on Interactions with Healthcare Professionals. These codes
of conduct add to the potentially conflicting advice regarding effective compliance
programs, and the Policy Proposal might have been stronger if it attempted to reconcile
its suggestions with existing public and private guidances.41
Emerging developments indicate that a compliance program that comports with extant
OIG authority may not suffice. The sheer number of ethical codes signifies the
tremendous amount of attention that the pharmaceutical industry has received in the past
few years. Nonetheless, it can be difficult to grasp exactly what is expected of the
industry. The authors of the Policy Proposal did recognize that most pharmaceutical
companies appear to have active compliance programs in place.42 But, to have an active
compliance program may not be adequate. Given the enhanced reimbursement
relationship that the pharmaceutical industry will have with the government by virtue of
Medicare Part D, the industry may need to be more adaptable and aggressive in
compliance than previously contemplated.

III. The Medicare Modernization Act and Medicare Part D

39

Compare PhRMA CODE, supra note 37, at 9, with OIG Compliance Program Guidance for
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fed. Reg. 23,731, 23,738 (May 5, 2003) (notice), available at
oig.hhs.gov/authorities/docs/03/050503FRCPGPharmac.pdf (last visited May 24, 2007).
40
See OIG Compliance Program Guidance for Pharmaceutical Manufacturers, 68 Fed. Reg. at 23,731.
41
See generally ADVANCED MED. TECH. ASS’N, CODE OF ETHICS ON INTERACTIONS WITH
HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS (2003), available at www.advamed.org/publicdocs/coe_with_faqs_415-05.pdf (last visited May 24, 2007); CODE OF MEDICAL ETHICS, supra note 26; HEALTH INDUS.
GROUP PURCHASING ASS’N, CODE OF CONDUCT PRINCIPLES (2002), available at
www.higpa.org/pressroom/2002/7-29HIGPACode.pdf (last visited May 24, 2007). An excellent
comparison chart of the various codes has been created and updated by Kathleen McDermott and can be
found on the American Health Lawyers Association website for members at
www.healthlawyers.org/Template.cfm?section=Practice_Corner&template=/MembersOnly.cfm&ContentI
D=4548.
42
See Brennan et al., supra note 26, at 429 (noting that pharmaceutical manufacturers have been regulating
themselves more stringently).
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The strong likelihood of increasing scrutiny is enhanced exponentially by the MMA.43
The import of this law for the pharmaceutical industry cannot be understated. After
decades of Medicare paying primarily for services and durable goods through Medicare
Parts A and B, Congress decided that outpatient drugs would be reimbursed through a
new benefit, Medicare Part D.44 Though Medicaid has long included pharmaceuticals in
its list of reimbursable program elements, the creation of a new “part” of Medicare is a
milestone.45
To give a brief overview of the changes in reimbursement resulting from the MMA: the
few drugs that had been covered by Medicare Part A and Part B will continue to be
covered by those parts and will not be included in the Part D program.46 The method of
calculating reimbursement for many Part B drugs will be changed from 95% of the
average wholesale price (AWP) to a system that has its foundation in CIAs with
pharmaceutical manufacturers, called the Average Sales Price (ASP).47 Reimbursement
will be 106% of either the ASP or the Wholesale Acquisition Cost (WAC), depending on
the role the drug company plays.48 To ensure that reported prices reflect actual costs, the
OIG will compare the ASP or WAC to the “widely available market price” (WAMP) and
to the Medicaid Average Manufacturer Price (AMP).49 This system allows physicians

43

See Medicare Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173,
117 Stat. 2066 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 21, 26, and 42 U.S.C.). The MMA included
many other changes to the health-care system that are only tangentially related to Medicare, such as
facilitating the expansion of health savings accounts in such a way that they more closely resemble
individual retirement accounts. See, e.g. id. § 233, 117 Stat. at 2209; see also John V. Jacobi, ConsumerDirected Health Care and the Chronically Ill, 38 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 531, 550 (2005) (describing
health savings accounts as a microcosm of the push for consumer-directed health plans and the codification
of HSAs in the MMA as an example of their continued popularity).
44
Medicare Part A, the hospital insurance program, pays hospitals and other institutional “providers” for
their services to Americans over the age of sixty-five who have paid into the Social Security system. See 42
U.S.C. § 1395c (2005). Drugs used as part of a covered inpatient hospital and/or nursing home stay have
been covered by Medicare Part A. See id. §§ 1395c, 1395(a)(1)(S). Medicare Part B, called Supplementary
Medical Insurance, is a voluntary benefit in which seniors who receive Part A may pay to participate for a
premium that increases yearly (at least now, although for a long time it remained fl at). See id. §§ 1395j,
1395r(a)(1). Medicare Part B has paid for drugs that cannot be self-administered; a typical example is drugs
used in chemotherapy to kill cancerous cells (oncolitics). See id. § 1395u(o).
45
Medicare Part C is not really a “part” of Medicare, meaning it is not a separate benefit in the way that
Parts A, B, and D are “parts.” Instead, Part C simply creates a way for managed care companies to service
Medicare beneficiaries by combining the other parts of Medicare; it does not add a new type of coverage
per se. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395w-21 to w-29 (2003 & Supp. 2005).
46
CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. (CMS), DHHS, MEDICARE PART B VERSUS
PART D COVERAGE ISSUES 1 (Draft July 27, 2005), available at
www.cms.hhs.gov/PrescriptionDrugCovGenIn/Downloads/PartBandPartDdoc_07.27.05.pdf (last visited
May 24, 2007) (providing a forty-page chart describing whether Medicare Part B or Part D should be billed
for certain drugs).
47
See Alex Sugerman-Brozan & James Woolman, Drug Spending and the Average Wholesale Price:
Removing the AWP Albatross from Medicaid’s Neck, 13 HEALTH CARE POL’Y REP. (BNA) (2006),
available at healthcenter.bna.com/pic2/hc.nsf/id/BNAP-6G8NPZ?OpenDocument (last visited May 24,
2007).
48
See MMA § 303(c).
49
See id.
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either to use a competitive bidding process for the drugs supplied in-office or to rely on
the ASP calculation.50
While some cost-reporting methodologies are changing, the old pitfalls for drug
reimbursement appear to remain under the MMA in the sense that pharmaceutical
manufacturers are given somewhat vague standards for describing and proving the actual
cost of drugs for Medicare. This is not far different from the problems that have existed
historically under the AWP system. The intricacy of the calculations to determine prices
for Part B drugs alone reveals the potential number of compliance pitfalls that await
pharmaceutical manufacturers. Although the calculus for reporting prices is elaborate, it
seems to be relatively open-ended (in comparison to the systems for reimbursement of
other healthcare items and services) and thus increases the potential for eventual charges
of wrongdoing.
Medicare has never had such a vested interest in the workings of the pharmaceutical
industry.51 The scope of the MMA signals the magnitude of the changes to Medicare in
creating this benefit, which in turn indicates the scale of the impact on the pharmaceutical
industry both in quotidian operations and in the long-term compliance realm. Although
Medicaid programs have covered outpatient drugs for many years, many Medicaid Fraud
Control Units have not had the mandate or resources to decipher the complex rules
surrounding the AMP, rebates, and other methods of calculating the amount that
Medicaid reimburses for drugs.52 Some observers perceive that the pharmaceutical
industry had “beaten” the Medicaid reimbursement system for years, noting that the
repercussions had been relatively minor until recently.53 The perceived lack of
prosecutorial resources at the state and federal level is bound to change now that more
federal money for enforcement is expected to flow to this sector of the healthcare
industry.
Direct reimbursement by Medicare also means that the DOJ will have many more
opportunities to regulate the industry through enforcement of the federal False Claims
Act.54 In the past, whistleblowers developed novel legal theories to bring actions under
the False Claims Act, attempting to prove the chain of causation to reach the deep
pockets of the pharmaceutical manufacturers.55 Now such proof will be more
50

See id. § 303(d).
See ALICE G. GOSFIELD, MEDICARE AND MEDICAID FRAUD AND ABUSE § 1.31 (2005)
(asserting that the enactment of the MMA will subject the pharmaceutical industry to the focus of fraud and
abuse law because of the new regulatory scheme that applies directly to the industry); Henderson &
Cassady, supra note 22, at 108–09 (describing some of the reasons for the increased prosecutorial interest
in the pharmaceutical industry). Also, with the new Democratic majority in Congress, the push for
Medicare negotiation of drug prices may serve to further in crease this intensified focus, as even less room
will exist for drug pricing to be peripatetic.
52
Cf. 42 U.S.C. § 256b (2005).
53
See Krause, supra note 14, at 266 – 72 (using the trends of fraud and abuse prosecutions in the
pharmaceutical industry as an example of how such prosecutions can change the law when Congress and/or
agencies fail to act against a particular sector of the healthcare industry).
54
See generally 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729 – 3733 (2005).
55
See, e.g., United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, No. Civ.A. 96-11651PBS, 2003 WL 22048255, at
*4 – 5 (D. Mass. Aug. 22, 2003); United States ex rel. Franklin v. Parke-Davis, 147 F. Supp. 2d 39, 50–53
51
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straightforward. Instead of relying on an attenuated line of information, influence, and
purchase, prosecutors will be able to simply show the direct link between the
pharmaceutical manufacturer and the Medicare reimbursement. Already a favorite tool of
federal prosecutors for prosecuting healthcare fraud, the False Claims Act has the
potential to become even more popular for regulating the pharmaceutical industry. The
pharmaceutical industry will not be under the microscope alone; Part D contractors and
Medicare Advantage Plans already face challenges regarding their receipt of federal
monies as well.56 Medicare Part D, however, will add to the federal examination of the
industry immensely; CMS has stated that it will enforce the rights of Medicare
beneficiaries stringently in the context of Medicare Part D and will carefully examine the
sales practices of the entities offering the drug plan.57
Further, in the Special Advisory Bulletin on Patient Assistance Programs for Medicare
Part D Enrollees, the OIG warned that patient assistance programs raise anti-kickback
concerns be-cause pharmaceutical manufacturers’ subsidies for Part D drugs may be
perceived as a payment to influence the purchase of an item directly reimbursed by
Medicare—the very definition of a kickback.58 As the OIG described, such practices raise
the “usual risks of fraud and abuse associated with kickbacks, including steering
beneficiaries to particular drugs; increasing costs to Medicare; providing a financial
advantage over competing drugs; and reducing beneficiaries[’] incentives to locate and
use less expensive, equally effective drugs.”59 Beneficiary protection is just one aspect of
the predicted increase in federal scrutiny of pharmaceutical manufacturers.
The price for the privilege of Medicare reimbursement has always been subjection of
providers to the corpus of fraud and abuse laws. With the pre-MMA success of the DOJ
and OIG in negotiating large settlements with pharmaceutical manufacturers for alleged
Medicaid fraud and/or abuse, and given that significantly more federal money will be
(D. Mass. 2001) (in which a relator almost successfully enforced FDA regulations through a civil False
Claims Act theory of liability; Pfizer ultimately settled the case and agreed to enter a CIA).
56
See Robert Pear, Methods Used by Insurers Are Questioned, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2007 (describing
investigations into improper enrollment methods used by Medicare Advantage companies); see also Part D
Drug Benefit, Part D Fraud Opportunities Abound; PDPs Will Be Key to Detection, 16 MEDICARE REP.
(BNA) 1151 (Sept. 30, 2005) (reporting on Assistant U.S. Attorney Jim Sheehan and private attorney
Elizabeth Carder-Thompson’s predictions on the fraud and abuse possibilities that await pharmacies and
Part D plans).
57
See Press Release, CMS, DHHS, Medicare Expands Efforts to Fight Fraud (Oct. 7, 2005), available at
www.cms.hhs.gov/apps/media/press/release.asp?Counter=1690 (last visited May 24, 2006). Additionally,
the reimportation of drugs from other countries has been folded into the Medicare drug benefit
conversation, which adds to industry pressure. See Kelly McCormack & Bob Cusack, AARP Edges Away
from Drug Imports, THE HILL, Jan. 4, 2006, at 1, copy available at tinyurl.com/2snyok (last visited May
24, 2007); Henry J. Kaiser Family Foundation, Prescription Drugs: AARP Analysis Finds Medicare Drug
Benefi t Will Save Seniors More Money than Prescription Drug Reimportation, DAILY REPORTS, Jan. 4,
2006, available at www.kaisernetwork.org/daily_reports/rep_index.cfm?DR_ID=34589 (last visited May
24, 2007).
58
See Publication of OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on Patient Assistance Programs for Medicare Part D
Enrollees, 70 Fed. Reg. 70,623, 70,625 (Nov. 22, 2005) (notice).
59
Id. at 70,625. The OIG goes on to suggest that independent charities created by pharmaceutical
manufacturers might be able to properly assist beneficiaries who struggle with drug costs. See id. at 70,626
– 27.
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flowing directly to pharmaceutical manufacturers through the Part D benefit, it appears
only a matter of time before investigations of pharmaceutical companies for Medicare
fraud follow.60 Because the system of payment for drug costs has become more
complicated under the MMA, pharmaceutical manufacturers will not only be subject to
increased scrutiny but may also be unable to defend their decisions by relying on
arguably vague guidance. The Physicians At Teaching Hospitals (PATH) audits at
academic medical centers serve as a reminder that it is difficult for a provider to
successfully defend its actions when reimbursement guidance is unclear—or even
nonexistent.61 To avoid such pitfalls, the pharmaceutical industry may need to reach
beyond the OIG’s current vision of compliance to incorporate best practices so that board
members understand that they too should be aware of, and may be held responsible for,
challenges facing the industry.

IV. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Pressure of Best Practices
The American Competitiveness and Corporate Accountability Act of 2002 (known as the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, in recognition of the bill’s main sponsors in the Senate) set forth
procedures and systems for publicly traded corporations that contribute to the demand for
high levels of proactive self-policing.62 The legislation has created an atmosphere of
intense inquiry for publicly traded companies that has forced a wide variety of
corporations to take a hard look at heretofore under-examined practices such as audits,
internal board practices, methods of operation, and document destruction; and rules have
been created for these and other issues.63 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act preceded the CPG for
pharmaceutical manufacturers and was a first taste of active corporate policing. Some
criticize the Sarbanes-Oxley Act for creating a “loud bark” with “no bite;”64 even so, it
raised public visibility not only of the malfeasance of certain corporations, but also of the
judicial concept of best practices.65 Many companies have attempted to implement best
practices, even though such measures are not specifically codified in the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act.66
60

The OIG Special Advisory Bulletin on Patient Assistance Programs for Medicare Part D Enrollees
indicates that the investigation and enforcement arm of the Medicare program has already been looking for
fraudulent schemes. See id. at 70, 628.
61
See OIG, DHHS, SEMIANNUAL REP. at 5–6 (Oct. – Mar. 1998) (describing the PATH audit initiative).
62
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28,
and 29 U.S.C).
63
See BOARDSOURCE & INDEPENDENT SECTOR, THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 2 (2003) [hereinafter BOARDSOURCE &
INDEPENDENT SECTOR], available at www.independentsector.org/PDFs/sarbanesoxley.pdf (last visited
May 24, 2007). This guidance document for nonprofits notes that the whistleblower protections and new
document destruction rules apply to all corporate entities, whether for-profit or nonprofit, which is
important for the healthcare industry as a whole. See id. at 9 – 10; see also William S. Duffey, Jr.,
Corporate Fraud and Accountability: A Primer on Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 54 S.C. L. REV. 405
(2002) (discussing the highlights of Sarbanes-Oxley).
64
See J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Irrelevance of State Corporate Law in the Governance of Public
Companies, 38 U. RICH. L. REV. 317, 320–21 (2004) (arguing that the Sarbanes-Oxley Act allows the
same types of scandals to occur to which it was drafted in reaction).
65
See BOARDSOURCE & INDEPENDENT SECTOR, supra note 63, at 2.
66
See id.
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Examples of best practices evolving to become part of a corporation’s requirements have
been displayed in the Disney cases that pervaded Delaware courts for a time.67 The court
in Brehm v. Eisner noted that “[a]spirational ideals of good corporate governance
practices for boards of directors that go beyond the minimal legal requirements of the
corporation law are highly desirable. . . . But they are not required by the corporation law
and do not define standards of liability.”68 In the same vein, the court in In re Walt
Disney Company stated that “best practices of corporate governance include compliance
with fiduciary duties. Compliance with fiduciary duties, however, is not al-ways enough
to meet or to satisfy what is expected by the best practices of corporate governance.”69
Despite reinforcement of the best practices ideal in these high-profile cases, no case
specifically delineates the governing principles that constitute best practices.
Recognizing the gap between ideal and doctrinal reality, former Delaware Supreme Court
Chief Justice Veasey set forth a number of principles in 2005 intended to guide directors
in understanding the concept of best practices and to mitigate the outcome if a
corporation is reviewed by a court or administrative agency.70 Justice Veasey’s
suggestions range from ideals, such as embracing best practices, to practical benchmarks,
such as commanding directors to understand their corporation’s business, market,
competition, financial controls, and financial disclosures.71
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See, e.g., Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 256 (Del. 2000); In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., No.
15452, 2005 Del. Ch. LEXIS 113, *1 (Del. Ch. Aug. 9, 2005).
68
Brehm, 746 A.2d at 256.
69
In re Walt Disney Company Derivative Litig. at *147.
70
See E. Norman Veasey, What Happened in Delaware Corporate Law and Governance from 1992-2004?
A Retrospective on Some Key Developments, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1399, 1506 – 08 (2005).
71
See id. Justice Veasey took care to set forth a full list of guidelines, which are as follows:
• Be careful and thoroughly investigate the integrity and financial position of a company before
agreeing to serve as a director.
• Embrace best practices in governance processes.
• Appoint a strong independent board leader, whether a nonexecutive chair or a lead director.
• Be certain that all directors are financially literate.
• Be certain that the board has regular executive sessions.
• Pay special attention to the board agenda—is the board focused on the right issues and is the board
involved in making that determination?
• Make sure you have a reasonably complete understanding of the company’s business, competitive
environment, financial controls, and financial disclosures. The same is true of the need to have a
thorough understanding of a particular transaction being considered for board action.
• Pay special attention to the board’s information needs—does the board have access to the
information it needs, and is the board in control of determining what information it needs?
• Actively engage in board discussions and deliberations with healthy skepticism always and
constructive criticism when called for. There is no such thing as a “stupid” question.
• Review board and committee minutes—and ask that they be circulated to all directors within a
week for comments (not approval; that can wait)—to ensure they accurately reflect the matters
considered, and capture the general extent and nature of the board’s discussions, deliberations,
considerations, decisions, and directions (not a transcript of who said what).
• Insist that management keep track of and report progress on items that came before the board and
resulted in board decisions or directions.
• Take special care in reviewing registration statements.
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The last element reflects the principles found in the landmark case In re Caremark.72 The
Caremark court described healthcare directors’ fiduciary duties to include a “duty to
monitor,” meaning that directors must understand how their company implements its
compliance program and ensure that an “information and reporting system” exists, almost
rendering the board a super-compliance committee.73
The command to understand the market, its controls, and a company’s internal response
to compliance constraints is particularly important for pharmaceutical companies
instituting best practices because they are part of a highly complex and highly regulated
market. Many companies now are subject to the rules of the FDA, CMS, and the SEC
(though, unlike other healthcare providers, they are not also subject to state licensure
laws). This means that pharmaceutical companies and their boards of directors are under
pressure to act not only within the confines of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, but also within
the OIG’s compliance guidance, the private ethical codes, FDA rules, and Medicare
rules.74 The close inspection that is encouraged by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and best
practice ideals compounds the impact of these other legal developments. Directors must
adhere to the usual fiduciary duties and ensure that, in the spirit of best practices, their
companies are compliant with the many authorities that attempt to guide them.

V. HIPAA Privacy Regulations
An additional source of potential scrutiny, liability, and con-fusion is the far-reaching net
of HIPAA and its privacy regulations, especially with recent indications that the Office
for Civil Rights intends to crack down on violations of the privacy rules. Congress
enacted HIPAA to ensure portability of health insurance from one employer to another.
Whatever its original intent, however, the impact of HIPAA privacy regulations has been
to affect the privacy of medical records in such a way that the marketing practices of the
pharmaceutical industry may be permanently altered.75

•
•
•
•
•
•

Make sure disclosures are clear and that you understand them; ask management for assurances and
representations.
Ask independent auditors for assurances of the integrity of the reporting and their due diligence.
Understand what you sign.
Beware of a CEO who manages to the market, or who tries unduly to manage the board.
Resist a culture of complacency when things look to be running well.
Rely in good faith on well-chosen experts.

Best practices must be realistic. Do not undertake to jump over an impossibly high bar of best practices.
Failure to follow your own guidelines is not a good optic in court.
Id.
See In re Caremark Int’l, Inc. Deriv. Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 968–70 (Del. Ch. 1996) (discussing the
board’s duty to monitor corporate activities).
73
Id. at 970–71.
74
See Scheineson & Klinger, supra note 23, at 1 – 2.
75
See Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
72
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The HIPAA privacy regulations apply to “Covered Entities,” a term that is defined to
include healthcare providers that engage in certain electronic healthcare transactions,
health information clearinghouses, and health plans.76 Pharmaceutical companies
generally are considered to be none of these;77 however, because clinical trials often
involve human subjects, Covered Entity status may be imposed on pharmaceutical
manufacturers in some circumstances.78 The privacy regulations also apply to “Business
Associates” of Covered Entities, and Business Associates must adhere by contract to the
privacy regulations (rather than by direct application); notably, the regulation-defined
status of being a Business Associate depends on what the associate does, not what it is.79
Although many hospitals and other healthcare providers have attempted to enter Business
Associate Agreements with pharmaceutical manufacturers to bind them to the HIPAA
regulations, the industry generally does not perform services that bring it within the
definition of a Business Associate and such agreements were avoided in many cases.80
Nonetheless, certain practices of sales representatives raise concerns under the privacy
regulations. For example, “shadowing” a physician while observing patients and/or
participating in the physician’s interaction with patients raise HIPAA privacy concerns if
the patient does not have an opportunity to consent or to refuse the drug representative’s
presence in the examining room.81 This may pose even more difficulties for the medical
device industry, which traditionally employs medically trained sales representatives who
train physicians in the operating room. Other common practices of sales representatives
76

See 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164 (2005).
The industry may be subject, however, to state privacy laws that are considered more “strict” than
HIPAA or that have a different basis on which to protect the privacy of patient records, especially if they
pay pharmacies for patient information or to solicit patients on their behalf. For example, the drugstore
chain Eckerd was investigated by the attorney general of Florida for failure to seek unambiguous
authorization from customers to be solicited by Eckerd on behalf of drug companies. See Press Release,
Fla. Attorney Gen., Eckerd Endows $1 Million Ethics Chair at FAMU, Revises Policies to Help Protect
Patient Privacy (July 10, 2002), available at
http://myfloridalegal.com/newsrel.nsf/newsreleases/28930326B8C35ADE85256BF200544B94 (last visited
May 24, 2007).
78
See Meredith Kapushion, Hungry, Hungry HIPAA: When Privacy Regulations Go Too Far, 31
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1483, 1499 (2004) (observing that HIPAA privacy regulations have made clinical
research more difficult for all parties involved in clinical trials).
79
See 45 C.F.R. § 160.103.
80
As with all industries that are subject to frequent litigation, avoidance of un-necessary regulatory
commitments was certainly a reason for reluctance to sign business associate agreements.
81
Shadowing is clearly a method of marketing that requires the patient’s authorization. See OFF. FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS, DHHS, FACT SHEET: PROTECTING THE PRIVACY OF PATIENTS’ HEALTH
INFORMATION (Apr. 14, 2003), available at www.hhs.gov/news/facts/privacy.html (last visited May 24,
2007). The Office for Civil Rights stated:
77

The final privacy rule sets new restrictions and limits on the use of patient information
for marketing purposes. Pharmacies, health plans and other covered entities must first
obtain an individual’s specific authorization before disclosing their patient information
for marketing. At the same time, the rule permits doctors and other covered entities to
communicate freely with patients about treatment options and other health-related
information, including disease-management programs.
Id.
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can be affected as well; for example, the unrestricted access to patient records that they
once enjoyed in physician offices and hospitals cannot continue under HIPAA
constraints.82 Patient information should be de-identified before being shared because it
would no longer be considered protected health information. But, this would be an
onerous process that places a significant administrative burden on the physician and
renders information potentially less useful for the pharmaceutical company.83 Of course,
these difficulties are solved if the provider can obtain unambiguous written patient
authorization for the sales representative’s presence and for file-sharing, but not all
patients will agree to execute such a consent.
HIPAA compliance also provides another rationale for DHHS to monitor the activities of
the pharmaceutical industry and its sales force. Many federal prosecutors have appeared
interested to begin investigating sales and marketing efforts by the industry, and HIPAA
may complement the False Claims Act efforts.84 The industry thus faces the task of
finding ways to obtain authorizations whenever patient information is sought. In the years
following the initial implementation of the privacy regulations, patient authorizations
have become a regular part of the health-care system; as a result, and assuming that the
authorizations include language that allows access by pharmaceutical partners, the need
for authorizations may be less of a concern than the complicating effect that HIPAA may
have on the industry overall. HIPAA adds to the many regulatory demands on the
pharmaceutical industry and potentially to physicians’ conflicts of interest as described in
the Policy Proposal.

VI. Comparison to History of Reimbursement for the Hospital Industry
The evolution in hospital reimbursement may serve as a cautionary example for the
pharmaceutical industry regarding the effects of scrutiny by the federal government,
private payors, and the media. Hospital payment systems were developed at a time when
surgery became an everyday occurrence that required uniform and complex physical
support structures as well as reliable support staff.85 Rather than continuing to depend on
charity, hospitals sought payment from patients, who paid whatever amounts hospitals
billed for providing a service (often to the detriment of physicians).86 Although
physicians and hospitals alike loathed the idea of intermediaries between healthcare
service and direct patient payment, health insurance (in the form of Blue Cross and Blue
Shield) emerged in the early 1900s, modifying the hospital payment model slightly by
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Because exceptions for sharing information exist for public health reasons, it is unlikely that FDA
regulations requiring reporting of errors and defects will create HIPAA violations, especially because the
exception for public health includes reporting to the FDA. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.512(b)(iii).
83
See id. § 164.502 (excluding de-identified information from the definition of protected health
information).
84
See Bruce Japsen, Targets Change in Drug Probes; Manufacturers Under Scrutiny, CHI. TRIB., Dec.
27, 2001, at N1.
85
See PAUL STARR, THE SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN MEDICINE, 145–79
(discussing the history of hospitals in the United States from almshouses to scientific centers of medical
care and from charitable institutions to businesses).
86
See id. at 161, 299.
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adding a third party to the payment process.87 The Blue Cross/Blue Shield format became
a standard model for American health insurance and helped shape the construction of
Medicare in the 1960s.88 Effective lobbying ensured the place of Blue Cross/Blue Shield
in the Medicare world in the form of fiscal intermediaries and carriers.89 Thus, for many
years Medicare Part A payment mirrored the Blue Cross/Blue Shield system, meaning
that hospitals were paid reasonable costs as set by the hospital.90
Although this system was lucrative and fairly simple administratively for hospitals, it was
expensive for the federal government and the taxpayer.91 After attempting a reasonable
cost system in the 1970s,92 Medicare moved to a more controlling structure in the early
1980s that is still used, known as the inpatient prospective payment system (IPPS).93
Through the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982,94 Congress instituted a
system wherein hospitals are required to submit cost reports to account for their expenses,
which were no longer determined by direct costs. Instead, an algorithm accounts for the
patient’s diagnosis upon discharge and creates a national monetary value for the cost of
treating that patient, which is then adjusted to account for geographic differences in
costs.95
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See id. at 295 – 98.
See Clark C. Havighurst, Freedom of Contract: The Unexplored Path to Health Care Reform, in
AMERICAN HEALTH CARE: GOVERNMENT, MARKET PROCESSES, AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST 145, 154 (Roger D. Feldman ed., Transaction Publishers 2000). A microcosmic example of this
progression can be seen in New York’s insurance market. See Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v. State of
New York, 840 N.E.2d 68 (2005). The facts of this case trace the history of Associated Health Service,
which became Empire Blue Cross/Blue Shield, a hospital service plan, then a Medicare fiscal intermediary,
and later a commercial insurer with a variety of health insurance products. See id. at 68 – 78
89
Under the MMA, carriers and intermediaries will be called simply “contractors.” See Medicare
Prescription Drug, Improvement, and Modernization Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-173, § 911, 117 Stat.
2066, 2378 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395h, 1395kk-1, 1395u (2003)).
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14 ANNALS HEALTH L. 267, 269–71 (2005) (describing the cost-based retrospective payment system
under which hospitals received the reasonable cost of their services so long as the service was covered by
Medicare).
91
The General Accounting Office issued a report in 1986 that Blue Cross plans were not different from
commercial insurers in any material respect, and that they did not warrant the designation of “social welfare
organization” that had led to the federal tax-exempt status. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
HEALTH INSURANCE: COMPARING BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD PLANS WITH
COMMERCIAL INSURERS 21 (1986), available at archive.gao.gov/d4t4/130462.pdf; see also
Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 840 N.E.2d at s72 – 73. This financial blow to insurers also led to more
meager funds for hospitals and contributed to scrutiny of hospital cost-reimbursement systems.
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Structures; A Regeneration of Tax Exemption Standards, 37 B.C. L. REV. 1, 18 – 19 (1995) (discussing the
failure of the reasonable cost system in Medicare).
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Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 109-80, 96 Stat. 324 (codified as amended
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
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amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395f, 1395y, 1395ww (2005)).
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This simplified description helps to illustrate that complex forms of cost containment
have been created and imposed on Medicare participating providers and can be
anticipated again.96 After hospitals had been encouraged for years to lower expenses,
cost-restraint systems ultimately were created for them, not only through the Medicare
IPPS system, but also through commercial insurers’ restriction of cost by movement to
“lower of cost or charge” reimbursement, and ultimately through managed care and
negotiated rates.97 In other words, hospitals were subject to restraints, arguably because
they refused to control themselves.98 A historical examination of hospital reimbursement
reminds the pharmaceutical industry (as the most recently added Medicare provider) that
cost containment can, and likely will, be imposed on the services and products to be
reimbursed under Part D.99
The cost and sales price of drugs has been a hotly debated topic in the public and the
media, and the calculus for drug reimbursement under Medicare Part D, although quite
complex, currently contains no cost-control measures.100 For example, prescription drug
plans (PDPs, the stand-alone drug benefit) and Medicare Advantage Plans (MA Plans,
Medicare managed care, which com-bines Parts A, B, and D) set the monthly premiums
that Medicare beneficiaries will pay.101 The MMA does not limit the premiums that will
be charged to beneficiaries, instead requiring that PDPs and MA Plans negotiate prices
with drug companies in creating their formularies, which in turn influence the price of
premiums. Because the Part D drug benefit will be administered by private entities, and
because of the uncertainties inherent in the new ASP calculation, the actual amount that
will be reimbursed for covered drugs is not immediately apparent.102 What is evident,
however, is that the MMA did not give the federal government the ability to control drug
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prices under Part D (a fact that may change if the new Democratic majority is successful
with its agenda).
The Medicare Part D system appears to be similar to the original indemnity model that
was used for hospitals under Part A, under which system the price was set by the
healthcare provider with virtually no direct control by the reimbursing government
agency.103 Such a laissez-faire approach may not be inherently improper, but it has
historically been disfavored and seems unlikely to achieve longevity. Also, it does not
appear to be consistent with Medicaid drug reimbursement methodology, which has
required a measurable discount from pharmaceutical manufacturers. Learning from the
lessons of hospitals, which had insisted (in a manner similar to the current pharmaceutical
industry) that profit was necessary for ongoing growth and that constraints should not be
enacted, the pharmaceutical industry may wish to consider what form of cost containment
it prefers. If the industry can formulate its own constraints, then it may avoid the
imposition of an arduous system similar to the IPPS.
Given past experiences, it seems logical to anticipate that where federal money exists in
unrestricted amounts, increased provision of items and services will follow.104 Where
increased provision of items and services occur, fraud and abuse (and thus prosecution)
may also arise.105 The current state of virtually un-conditional payment for Part D drugs
brings the pharmaceutical industry full circle in terms of compliance concerns and
presents yet more evidence to anticipate enhanced governmental scrutiny. Congress and
the OIG have stated that, due to the amount of money being spent on Part D services,
they are vigilant for fraud in the new drug program.106 This kind of scrutiny with regard
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to costs and levels of reimbursement often is followed by stepped-up fraud and abuse
prosecution to recoup illicitly gained federal money.

VII. Conclusion
The pharmaceutical industry, somewhat suddenly, finds itself at the center of many
different statutory and regulatory schemes, sources of authority, societal developments,
and intensified scrutiny.107 Viewed together, these disparate elements illuminate a need
for extra caution on the part of the industry, at least in the form of compliance programs
that expand beyond the existing letter of the law—compliance programs as originally
envisioned simply may not suffice. Without more stringent self-regulation, the intense
interest in the pharmaceutical industry may lead to a regulatory push that could eliminate
extant uncertainty but also result in unanticipated and cumbersome measures for the
industry.
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